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Ecological reserve networks are an important strategy for conserving biodiversity. One 
approach to selecting reserves is to use optimization algorithms that maximize an ecological 
objective function subject to a total reserve area constraint. Under this approach, economic 
factors such as potential land values and tenure arrangements are often ignored. Tradable 
landuse rights are proposed as an alternative economic mechanism for selecting reserves. 
Under this approach economic considerations determine the spatial distribution of 
development and reserves are allocated to sites with the lowest development value, 
minimizing the cost of the reserve network.  The configuration of the reserve network as well 
as the biodiversity outcome is determined as a residual. However cost savings can be used to 
increase the total amount of area in reserve and improve biodiversity outcomes. The 
appropriateness of this approach for regional planning is discussed in light of key 
uncertainties associated with biodiversity protection. A comparison of biodiversity outcomes 
and costs under ecological versus economic approaches is undertaken for the Boreal Forest 
Natural Region of Alberta, Canada. We find a significant increase in total area protected and 
an increase in species representation under the TLR approach. 
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1. Introduction 
The Rio Convention on Biodiversity (1992) commits governments to recognize and protect 
biodiversity values in land management decisions. Ecological reserves are protected areas where 
development and other anthropocentric activities are minimized or prohibited. They provide 
sanctuary for species at risk and are the cornerstone of any biodiversity protection strategy. 
Article 8 of the Convention calls for signatories to establish, regulate and manage networks of 
protected areas (reserve networks) to promote the protection of ecosystems, natural habitats and 
the maintenance of viable populations of species in natural surroundings (IUCN 1992). The goal 
of a reserve network is to maximize species representation and probability of persistence 
(Margules and Pressey 2000). Implied in this approach is the idea of efficiency, or that reserves 
should be selected to minimize the amount of land required to achieve these objectives. 
Improvements in computational power in the last decade have been accompanied by a 
corresponding emphasis on optimization approaches for designing reserve networks. 
Optimization approaches include the maximal coverage (MC) approach, which maximizes a 
biodiversity metric subject to an aggregate reserve area constraint  (c.f. Underhill 1994; Church, 
Stoms, and Davis 1996; Camm, Polasky, and Csuti 1996; Csuti et al. 1997). Maximal coverage 
is useful for countries or regions attempting to fulfill percentage based protected area targets 
such as the 12% guideline interpreted from the 1987 Brundtland Commission Report (Sanjayan 
and Soule 1997).  
Unfortunately there are numerous practical constraints to implementing "optimal" reserve 
networks. These include existing property right structures, social attitudes, costs, and political 
opposition (Pressey, Possingham, and Margules 1996). The result is that planned networks are  
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often not feasible. In reality, reserves tend to be allocated to low value sites in an ad hoc fashion 
and the goals of the reserve network are compromised (e.g. Pressey 1994; Simon et al. 1995; 
Thomas et al. 1997). This problem is particularly acute on public lands where resource rights are 
not comprehensive and multiple use problems abound. However when economic considerations 
are considered explicitly in conservation planning reductions in costs can lead to an increased 
level of protection. Recent studies demonstrate that the costs of achieving biodiversity targets are 
reduced if one accounts for land values in designating ecological reserves. Under the "budget 
constrained" (BC) approach, reserves are selected by minimizing the land costs associated with 
achieving a particular biodiversity metric (e.g. Faith, Walker, et al. 1996; Ando, Camm, et al. 
1998; Polasky, Camm et al. 2001). However, implementation of the budget constrained approach 
requires appropriate price signals to assign values to land use alternatives. These price signals 
are biased or non-existent on publicly owned lands where much conservation effort is applied.  
Finding appropriate mechanisms for assessing values and compensating costs is a 
persistent problem in biodiversity conservation (Panayotou 1997). As a result there is interest in 
the use of market mechanisms such as tradable permits that have the potential to reveal privately 
held values associated with public goods (e.g. Shogren et al. 1999; Tietenberg 2000). Under a 
tradable permit system the regulatory authority sets a cap on environmental resource use and 
allows the market to ration access to the resource so that the resulting pattern of use minimizes 
the cost of achieving the environmental objective (Montgomery 1972). Weber and Adamowicz 
(2002) propose tradable landuse rights (TLRs) as an economic mechanism for managing 
cumulative environmental effects on public forest lands. Under this system the regulator sets a 
cap on the amount of land that can be developed in a region and allocates the area available for  
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development through TLRs. Directing development towards sites with the highest economic 
potential minimizes the opportunity cost associated with the land use constraint. The potential 
cost savings associated with this approach can then be used to increase the amount of land set 
aside in habitat protection. The landscape ecology literature emphasizes the importance of the 
spatial configuration of habitat in determining the quality of reserves. However there is a 
tradeoff between the total amount and spatial configuration of habitat for biodiversity protection 
and the magnitude of the tradeoff is subject to debate with at least some ecologists suggesting 
that configuration matters only when there is very little habitat left (e.g. Fahrig 2001; Trzcinski, 
Fahrig, and Merriam 1999). By exploiting the tradeoff between total amount and configuration 
of area in reserve, the TLR approach may result in improved biodiversity outcomes. 
In this paper we apply the concept of TLRs to the problem of reserve design for 
biodiversity protection in a managed forest. We develop a case study for the boreal mixedwood 
ecological region of Alberta's Boreal Forest Natural Region (BFNR) and numerically compare 
biodiversity and economic outcomes under TLRs relative to the maximal coverage and budget 
constrained approaches. Over the last twenty years the BFNR has come under unprecedented 
pressure from industrial development. While ecological reserves are viewed as a key component 
for achieving ecological sustainability, the BFNR remains unprotected in a meaningful way 
(WRI, 2001). In the following section we present a formal model for selecting reserves using 
TLRs and discuss the robustness of this framework when the underlying assumptions are 
relaxed. The benefits of the TLR approach are discussed relative to MC and BC approaches, 
with an emphasis on the key uncertainties and risks associated with each. In section 3 we 
develop the case study and compare biodiversity and cost outcomes of each approach through  
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numerical simulation. We find large cost savings under TLRs that can be used to increase the 
total amount of area in reserve and increase species representation relative to the MC approach. 
This is an important finding since cost savings and flexibility in choosing the pattern of 
development may increase the political feasibility of completing a protected area network in this 
region. 
2. TLRs and the Reserve Selection Problem. 
Assume that a fixed percentage of land in a region is to be set in reserve for habitat 
protection. This is a coarse filter approach to biodiversity protection and a realistic 
representation of actual strategies for regional biodiversity conservation (e.g. Faith 1997; 
Sanjayan and Soule 1997). Biodiversity objectives are addressed in the selection of the amount 
and type of land to be set aside. Although the model implicitly assumes one habitat type the 
regulator can create separate markets for different habitat types (Weber and Adamowicz 2002). 
Assume that the region is divided into n regular parcels of land (for example townships) 
that can be bought or sold. Let  A be equal to the total area of the region. Each land parcel hi is 
spatially referenced by i so that  A    =    h    i
i ∑ .  Economic attributes at site i are described by the 
vector  ] x    ...    2, x    1, x [   =    X iK i i i .  In general economic benefits are unevenly distributed over 
space due to variations in transportation costs, the heterogeneous distribution of extractable 
resources, and landscape characteristics that affect the cost of access to resources. Firms are 
denoted by  j=1, ... j. Each firm obtains a benefit of : 
) h       , X (    B   =   ) h (    B ij
j
i j ij j ∑ , if right to develop at site hi is allocated to j; 
  0   =   ) h (    B ij j  otherwise.  
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The benefits from developing site i are a function of the attributes at site i as well as the total 
number of rights already held at alternative sites.  
The reserve design problem is described as follows. A fixed percentage of the landscape, 
α , is slated for development. Therefore the development constraint is  A       =    A α . The remaining 
percentage, )    -    (1 α , is the basis for a reserve network.  The objective is to maximize the benefits 
from land use subject to the above land use constraint: 
(P1)   ) h   (    B        =   W    ij j
i j hij ∑ ∑ Max  
subject to 
(P1.1)    A     h   ij
n
=1 i
≤ ∑ ;   ( 0      ≥ λ ); 
 
(P1.2)    1       h    ij
j
j
≤ ∑ ;   ( 0       i ≥ µ ); 
 
(P1.3)    1}    {0,       hij ∈ . 
(P1) is equivalent to minimizing the opportunity costs of habitat protection. The first constraint 
limits the total amount of land available for development, while the second constraint allocates 
each site to only one firm.
1 The last constraint requires that a site be either fully developed or set 
aside as reserve. The solution to this problem is given by 
                                                 
1  The assumption that only one activity takes place at each site is motivated by the static 
framework and the fact that some activities, such as agriculture and forestry, at a particular site 
may be mutually exclusive. Nonetheless, we can extend this framework to the case where 
multiple firms and sectors may operate at each site without affecting the main results. 
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(2)  0       -     - ]   
H
B   +  
X









λ µ ;       j    i,    ∀ , 
 
where  h       =    H ij
i








Equation (2) sets the marginal benefit of site i to the user j that obtains development 
rights equal to the shadow price  λ µ    +    i  where λ  represents the cost of the aggregate reserve 
area constraint andµi represents the marginal value of the set of attributes found at site i. The 
marginal benefit in (2) includes benefits arising from quality attributes at site i (the first term on 
the LHS) as well as the marginal benefit of bringing an additional unit of land into production 
(the second term on the LHS).  If the marginal benefit of developing site i is less than λ , then 
site i is set aside as reserve. 
We show that a market for development rights can lead to the cost minimizing 
distribution of activities described by (2). Assume that firms bid for each parcel of land in the 
region, but only those  A units associated with the highest bids are allocated for development. If 
the bidding process is competitive, the decision rule facing each firm in choosing a bid for the 
right to develop site i is given by 
(3)    0     p   - ]   
H
B   +  
X










where pi  is the price paid by firm j for the right to develop site i. Equation (3) is equivalent to 
the decision rule given by equation (2) as long as  p    =       +    i i λ µ . Proof of this result is provided 
in the appendix. As long as (3) holds, TLRs minimize the opportunity cost associated with a  
  8 
reserve network, and cost savings can be used to increase the amount of land set aside in reserve 
and potentially improve biodiversity outcomes relative alternative reserve selection approaches.  
The cost minimization result obtained above is derived from a highly stylized model. In 
particular, the cost effectiveness of TLRs depends on the assumption that there are no spatial or 
network cost spillovers for firms. This allows each parcel of land to be treated as a homogeneous 
commodity whose economic value does not depend on the context of other sites in the network. 
In practice, transportation networks and fixed investment costs will lead to a violation of this 
assumption. However, the fact that auctions are common in natural resource markets where 
transportation costs are significant suggests that the magnitude of the inefficiency caused by 
network externalities might be small compared to the benefits of using auctions to allocate 
resources. Market power is another potential problem for TLRs in regions where a few large 
players dominate land use.
2 Issues of market power and spatial externalities can be addressed to 
some extent in the design of the permit market itself but are beyond the scope of this paper. It is 
important to note, however, that the costs associated with a reserve network are most likely to be 
greater than the minimum, but lower than under alternative approaches.  
The information environment in which conservation decisions are made is incomplete. 
Because of key uncertainties, MC and BC approaches may be inherently more risky than the 
TLR approach. Consider the issue of biodiversity measurement. Biodiversity criteria used in 
most MC and BC studies are based on species metrics and require data on the presence or 
absence of species as well as their geographical distribution. Species based diversity metrics 
                                                 
2 For example, market power is a potential problem in the BFNR where a few large 
forestry and oil and gas firms dominate land use (Weber and Adamowicz 2002).  
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vary according to the weight given to individual species. Weighting functions derived from 
"uniqueness" characteristics such as phylogenic distinctiveness (e.g. Vane-Wright, Humphries, 
and Williams 1991; Weitzman 1992; Faith 2002) have been supported by underlying utility 
theory  (Metrick and Weitzman 1998; Nehring and Puppe 2002). Unfortunately, many diversity 
metrics are not operational due to the high cost or impossibility of obtaining relevant information 
(Weikard 2002), and there is little empirical evidence backing the selection of one diversity 
measure over another. Since species classification is incomplete, surrogates such as umbrella 
species with large spatial requirements are often used to capture the presence of other species 
(Simberloff 1998).  However tests on the use of species based indicators as surrogates for 
biodiversity have not been promising. Reserves selected for conservation of different taxa or 
based on higher taxon surrogates often do not overlap, undermining their usefulness for 
biodiversity planning (e.g. Jaarsveld et al. 1998; Faith and Walker 1996).  Process based 
indicators such as habitat and ecosystem type have been advocated because they capture the 
conditions necessary for maintaining ecosystem function and data are readily available 
(Margules and Pressey 2000). 
A significant problem in reserve design is that it is difficult to incorporate factors 
important to species persistence such as the size, shape, or quality of habitat in selected sites. 
Part of the problem is that theory suggests conflicting requirements. Biogeography theory 
suggests large habitat patches support large populations of species for longer periods of time 
than small patches, and increased patch connectivity facilitates dispersal and improves 
persistence (van Langevelde et al. 2000).
3 However, this implies a tradeoff between a few large 
                                                 
3 Patch connectivity is defined by the distance between patches.  
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reserves that favour the persistence of some species versus more smaller reserves that together 
are more representative of biodiversity but are individually less effective for persistence 
(Margules and Pressey 2000). Furthermore, increased connectivity may increase species risk by 
making populations more vulnerable to spatially correlated environmental stresses such as fire, 
extreme weather, and disease (Hof and Flather 1996). 
Overall ecological theory suggests tradeoffs between reserve size, patch size, and 
connectivity. Unfortunately the tradeoffs are difficult to empirically assess.
4 In addition 
responses to fragmentation tend to be species specific and sensitive to the scale at which habitat 
is defined  (Cumming and Schmiegelow 2001). Although it is generally accepted that habitat 
quantity and configuration are substitutes for species persistence, the degree of substitutability 
between these two attributes is unclear. Nonetheless, there is at least some evidence that the 
amount of habitat is of greater importance that spatial configuration in forested landscapes, with 
spatial configuration becoming important only when there is very little habitat left (Fahrig 2001; 
Schmiegelow and Makkonnen 2002; Trzcinski, Fahrig, and Merriam 1999). 
The above discussion suggests that implementation of MC and BC approaches using 
species based biodiversity indicators may pose more risk than focusing on habitat or ecosystem 
protection. Moreover there is evidence that the cost effective TLR approach can improve 
biodiversity protection by increasing the total area in reserve. This suggests that the 
economically driven TLR approach may actually be less risky than alternative approaches based 
on species indicators. Practically the efficacy of the TLR approach depends on the magnitude of 
                                                 
4For example, the debate between one single large reserve versus several small reserves 
has no single answer and depends on the taxa, geographic locality and position of the reserves 
(Prendergast, Quinn, and Lawton 1999).  
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cost savings that can be reinvested in habitat protection. Expected cost savings are greatest when 
there is large spatial variation in resource values. If site values are uniform the mechanism for 
selecting the network is irrelevant in terms of costs. Cost savings will decrease as the size of the 
reserve network increases. This is because the opportunity to substitute low value for high value 
reserves is greatest when there are fewer reserves. In other words, the costs of achieving spatial 
objectives in terms of foregone habitat area are greatest precisely when it is most difficult to 
achieve spatial objectives - i.e. when the number of sites available for constructing contiguous 
habitat patches is low. Finally, transportation and networking costs play an important role in the 
location decisions of firms and the spatial arrangement of economic activity. This implies a 
tendency for industrial activities to be clumped around sites with high development value. The 
corollary is that protected areas are likely to be spatially clumped under the TLR approach.  
The appropriate role for economic criteria in reserve design is controversial. In practice 
the selection of protected areas because of their relative lack of development value has led to 
biased content in regional reserve systems, leaving species, communities, and ecosystems in the 
greatest need of reservation without protection (Pressey 1994). While the habitat value of 
potential reserves is heterogeneous, markets treat ecological attributes as homogeneous. 
Confining the spatial extent of the TLR market to a regional scale where habitat type is relatively 
homogeneous is necessary to minimize the potential for systematic bias in the selection of 
landscape attributes in the reserve network. The quality of the reserve network may still vary due 
to the spatial distribution of protected habitat generated by the reserve network. However, as we 
show below, exploiting the tradeoff between total area protected and configuration can improve 
biodiversity outcomes for a given conservation budget.  
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3.  Data Description and Land Value Calculations 
The above discussion highlights some of the problems in choosing appropriate objectives 
for reserve selection algorithms and lends credibility to the economic approach to reserve 
selection. In this section we quantify the economic and ecological tradeoffs associated with 
alternative approaches to reserve design for protecting avian species in Alberta's Boreal Forest 
Natural Region (BFNR). The BFNR covers 52% of the provincial land base and constitutes most 
of the provinces forested land, the majority of which is publicly owned and allocated through a 
variety of lease agreements based on approved plans. Land values, where they exist, do not 
represent the true opportunity costs of setting a site aside for reserve since they are distorted by 
regulatory terms and conditions of leases that attenuate leaseholder rights. The study area chosen 
for analysis consists of approximately 114,000 square km, or 1137 townships, in the boreal 
mixedwood ecological region of Northeastern Alberta.
5 The boreal mixedwood forest is a mosaic 
of stands of different ages and species composition. Each township represents a unit for the 
reserve selection problem. 
                                                 
5A township is equivalent to an area of 10 square km or 10,000 ha. 
Alberta Breeding Bird Atlas data recording the presence or absence of a suite of bird 
species were collected between 1987 and 1991 by the Alberta Federation of Naturalists and used 
to construct a biodiversity index. Multiple logistic regression models were use to develop 
prediction probabilities for the distribution of 27 bird species in the study area. Detection 
probabilities are based on habitat abundance and configuration metrics derived from 1993 
snapshots of Alberta phase 3 forest inventory data (Alberta Forest Service 1985). A complete  
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description of the methods used to generate the data can be found in Vernier, Schmiegelow and 
Cumming (2002). At the time the data were collected over half of the total extent of the boreal 
mixedwood region in Canada was still forested and the main Forest Management Agreement 
covering the study area had only just been approved. Therefore the prediction probabilities are 
assumed to represent the natural range of species detection rates across the study area. The 
"productivity" of a particular site is defined by the average of predicted detection probabilities 
across species given by: 
(4)  m   /        =   d li
m
=1 l
i ρ ∑ . 
The index specified in (4) weights species equally so that a comparison across sites reveals 
information about the total population of birds, but not particular species.
6 
                                                 
6 See Hof and Bevers (1998) for a discussion of probabilistic representation of species 
richness criteria in objective functions. 
The main contributors to forest disturbance in the study area are forestry, and oil and gas 
sector activities. Resource rents are equal to the discounted present value of the stream of future 
net revenues expected from resource exploitation. In a competitive market these rents would be 
capitalized in land prices that could then be use to calculate the opportunity cost of the reserve 
network. However, actual land prices are not available on public lands, and much of the 
deciduous timber resource in the study area is tied up in a forest management agreement and is 
not allocated through a market. In the remainder of this section we construct a proxy for land 
values using resource inventories and prices paid at auction for rights to exploit resources. Due 
to data limitations, estimates of resource values are derived from different time snapshots for  
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forestry (1993) and oil and gas (2001). For consistency, all prices used in the rent calculations 
are in 1992 constant dollars.  
Forestry rents are defined as the discounted present value of standing timber. A proxy for 
standing timber values was obtained from the Revised Alberta Timber Damage Assessment 
(TDA) updated for 2000-01 (Alberta Environmental Protection 1995). The TDA is used to 
compensate forest tenure holders for losses in trees arising from oil and gas sector activities. 
TDA values are derived from bonus prices paid in Alberta for commercial timber permits for 
coniferous and deciduous species. Bonus bids incorporate all private costs, including imputed 
transportation costs, and represent the expected discounted present value of the timber resource 
to private firms. In addition, the TDA includes an adjustment for annual allowable cut effects 
over the whole forest.
7 The TDA was applied to a 1993 snapshot of Alberta's phase 3 inventory. 
TDA values do not include dues paid to the crown.
8 Dues in Alberta vary by volume, wood type, 
product, and price. Average timber charges for 1999 by species type and volume were applied to 
the Phase III Inventory in order to calculate maximum potential foregone crown dues. These 
were added to TDA values to derive full forestry sector rents. 
Similarly, energy sector rents are equal to the discounted present value of remaining 
marketable oil and gas reserves, and consist of both private returns as well as royalty payments 
received by the government from energy production. Data on remaining marketable reserves and 
bonus bids for petroleum and natural gas (PNG) leases were obtained by the Alberta Energy 
                                                 
7 The annual allowable cut effect arises in regulated forests that prescribe constant 
harvest rates throughout a forest rotation. The allowable cut effect spreads any loss of inventory 
over the whole rotation by reducing the amount that can be harvested in subsequent years 
(Pearse 1990).  
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Utilities Board and used to estimate energy rents. Private returns are inferred from the price 
firms are willing to pay for PNG leases and are assumed to be equal to the total value of 
remaining marketable reserves net of royalties and costs. The leases grant surface rights for both 
the exploration and production of subsurface energy resources and cover all hydrocarbon 
resources except tar sands, and natural gas associated with coal seams. PNG bonus sales take 
place every two weeks and data were collected for the 5 year period  April 1, 1996 to March 31, 
2001.
9   
Royalties generated by the energy sector constitute a large percentage of Alberta's 
provincial budget. In general, approximately 30% of the market value of a typical oil or gas 
reserve will be paid out to the province in royalties. Foregone potential royalties were calculated 
by applying formulae published by the Alberta Government to the oil and gas reserve data base 
(Alberta Resource Development 1999). The existence of remaining marketable reserves does not 
guarantee that they will be exploited. Therefore it is necessary to weight potential royalty values 
by the probability that they will be realized. We assume that a firm purchases a lease if the price 
of the lease exceeds the discounted present value of the future net revenue stream. If there is no 
lease on a particular parcel of land, this implies that exploitation of underlying remaining 
reserves is not economically viable in the current period, ie., costs exceed revenues. Therefore 
the price paid for a PNG license incorporates the explicit cost of exploration and production, as 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 Alberta crown dues for forest resource improvement were not considered resource rents. 
9 There is a four year grace period in Northern Alberta between the date that licenses are 
issued and the date that drilling must commence. Therefore bid data for the 5 year period leading 
up to 2001 was felt to be a fair representation of the current expected discounted present value of 
remaining energy reserves. This period coincidentally encompasses both a trough (1998) and 
peak (2001) in energy prices.  
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well as the implicit cost associated with discounting the future revenue stream. Note that the 
greater the exploration risk, the more uncertain the future revenue stream implying lower prices 
for PNG licenses. Thus even if remaining marketable reserves have positive value in the current 
period, the discounted value may be zero if revenues are realized several years in the future or 
are highly uncertain. 
Because bid prices for PNG licenses incorporate exploration costs, risk, and discounting 
of future revenues, we can use these prices to discount the value of royalties from remaining 
marketable reserves. For example, if the value of PNG leases associated with remaining 
marketable reserves is zero, then the current discounted present value any associated royalties is 
also zero.
10 The expected value of a PNG  lease at site i  is given by: 
(5)  µ β β   +   x      -   x      =   X i2 2 i1 1 i  
where  1 xi  represents the total value of remaining reserves less royalties and  2 xi  represents the 
expected total costs associated with exploitation. The value of X  is equal to the price paid for 
the PNG lease. The total current value of remaining reserves, x1, is calculated using current oil 
and gas par prices. Although we do not have direct information on expected costs, x2 , low bid 
prices relative to the value of remaining reserves is indicative of high costs.  
The regression of X on x1 generates a forecast error  
(6)  x   P     -   x     =     =   X    -    X 1 12 2 2 2 β β ε ˆ   
                                                                                                                                                             
 
10 Although the private sector discount rate is not necessarily the social discount rate, it is 
the defacto discount rate for this problem since the reserves must be produced privately in order 
to generate any public revenue.  
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where  ) x )/Var( x   x Cov(    =    P 1 2 1 12 .
11  
Assuming constant or increasing returns to scale, the covariance between costs and reserve size 
is non-negative. Therefore the error term varies systematically and is a positive function of the 
cost associated with exploiting the reserve. In particular, The shape of the distribution of 
) x   /   ( 1 ε  is the same as that of  P      -    ) x   /   x (    12 2 1 2 2 β β , and the percentile rank of  ) x   /   ( 1 ε  will be 
the same as the percentile rank of  ) x   /   x ( 1 2 , or costs relative to the value of remaining 
marketable reserves. We use the distribution of  ) x   /   ( 1 ε across townships as a weighting factor to 
discount potential royalties based on the distribution of cost shares over the study area. The 
weighting index is equal to the percentile rank of each  ) x   /   ( 1 ε  within the distribution. Note that 
as relative costs decrease, the discount factor applied to royalties also decreases zero.  
  The total value of the energy sector was obtained by summing lease values and weighted 
royalty values by township. These were added to TDA values to obtain resource rents by 
township across the study area. These values are displayed in Table 1.
                                                 
11 The sign of  ) x )/Var( x   x Cov(    =    P 1 2 1 12  is a function of returns to scale since the size of 
remaining marketable reserves is the only source of variation in x1. 
  
  18 
 











































The total value of land rents for the study area is $26.4 billion. Table 1 shows that the 
average land value per township is equal to $23,218,242 ($2321 per ha.) and ranges from a 
minimum of $1,435,152 ($144 per ha.) to a maximum of $1,027,664,204 ($102,766 per ha.). It is 
interesting to view the relative rents from the forestry and energy sectors. The perception in 
Alberta is that the contribution of the forestry sector to the provincial economy is dwarfed by the 
contribution of the energy sector. However, the average forestry rent for the study area is 
$9,891,194 per township while the average energy sector rent is $13,327,048 per township. In 
spite of the large contribution of the energy sector to provincial revenues ex post, the average 
capitalized value of energy resources in land values ex ante is similar to that in the forest sector. 
This reflects the riskiness of energy exploration - the returns from PNG lease sales represent a 
negligible portion of energy rents (~1%) collected by the province. In addition, the low average 
value for energy sector rents arises from the spatial distribution of energy resources in the region 
as energy leases currently exist on only 55% of townships in the study area. There are several 
                                                 
12 Per hectare land values can be obtained by dividing by 10,000.  
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omissions in the land value estimates worth mentioning. First in spite of large bitumen deposits 
in the study area, we made no attempt to value the rents associated with tar sand development 
due to their relative complexity and lack of data. In addition, we don't include option values for 
future resources that may be developed such as coal-bed methane, peat, and gas shale.  
4. Simulation 
We compare the TLR approach to reserve selection with the maximal coverage and 
budget constrained approaches. Under the maximal coverage approach reserve sites are selected 
to maximize biodiversity subject to a constraint on the number of sites available for habitat 
protection. The maximal coverage (MC) problem is given by (P2): 
 
(P2)   (M)   Z    y       i i
n
=1 i yi ∑ Max  
subject to 
(P2.1)   A    -    A   =   k     y    i
n
=1 i
≤ ∑ ,  and  
(P2.2)   1}    {0,       yi ∈ . 
The problem in (P2) is an integer program where yi=1 if site i is selected for reserve, and 
zero otherwise. The total amount of area in reserve, k , is constrained in (P2.1) to be no greater 
than the total amount of area in the region, A, less the amount available for development,  A. The 
biodiversity index for each site,  (M) Zi , is defined on the set of species M to be represented in the 
network. In this simulation the objective is to maximize the expected probability of species  
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detection over the entire reserve network. Therefore  ρim
m
1
i      =   (M) Z ∑ .
13  To ensure that all 
species are represented in the reserve network we add the additional constraint: 
(P2.3)   1     s   y    ij i
n
=1 i
≥ ∑  
where  1    =    sij  if species j is present in township j, and zero otherwise. We make the arbitrary 
assumption that  1    =    sij  if probability of detection is above the 50th percentile in the distribution 
of detection probabilities for that species over the study area. The solution to MC is given by 
) k   |   (M Z
*
i . 
Since (P2) does not consider the relative opportunity cost associated with the various 
townships, the coverage problem is reformulated as a cost minimization problem to determine 
whether an alternative set of reserves could achieve  (M)   Z
* , the biodiversity outcome under (P2), 
at a lower cost. This is the basis of the budget constrained (BC) approach given by: 
 





1   =   i yi ∑ ∑ Min  
subject to 





≥ ∑  
where C(y) is the opportunity cost associated with the reserve network y, and V i is the land 
                                                 
13 Note that since A is a constant, maximizing expected detection over the network is 
equivalent to maximizing (P2). In addition, the formulation of (P2) suggests that species are 
"perfect substitutes" in the objective function. This is true for all metrics based on unweighted 
species richness criteria.  
  21 
value associated with township i. The reserve network solution to (P3) is given by  y ~.  By 
definition,  0       ) y C(    -    ) y C(
* ≤ ~ , in other words the BC approach requires more area of lower 
value to attain the same level of biodiversity generated by the MC approach. Finally, in order to 
numerically compare the MC and BC approaches to the TLR approach, (P1) is reformulated as 





1   =   i yi ∑ ∑ Min  
subject to (P2.1) and (P2.2). The TLR alogrithm results from the fact that TLRs find the least 
cost set of reserves for a particular reserve area constraint. 
Figure 1 illustrates the costs of biodiversity protection under the three alternative reserve 
selection approaches represented by (P1)-(P3).  The cost of reserves under MC increases 
linearly, while the cost under TLRs is convex indicating an initial abundance of low value land 
that can be cheaply set aside in habitat protection. Cost savings are quadratic in the size of the 
land constraint. As the size of the reserve network increases, there are fewer cheap substitute 
sites available, and costs under all approaches converge. The cost curve associated with BC 
indicates the least cost associated with obtaining  ) k   |   (M Z
*
i . If we compare the TLR and BC 
approaches in terms of biodiversity outcomes, the costs under TLRs will always be at least as 
high as under BC by definition of BC. Recall, however, that practical implementation of BC is 
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Although more land can be set aside under the TLR approach there is no guarantee that 
this will result in an increase in biodiversity protection as measured by Z(m).  Figure 2 illustrates 
biodiversity outcomes under the TLR and MC approaches.
14 We see that for a given land 
constraint, the MC approach always outperforms the TLR approach but at a decreasing rate. 
More importantly, we show that for a given budget constraint, TLRs outperform the MC 
approach in terms of biodiversity protection because the total amount of area available for 






                                                 
14 The BC approach yields the same biodiversity outcome as MC by definition.  
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Table 2 illustrates the potential benefit of TLRs using a 12% rule for protected area 
representation. Costs of a 12% reserve network under MC are $3.4 billion compared to $555 
million under TLRs while the level of biodiversity protection under MC is .076 relative to .056 
under TLRs.
15 Another way of looking at this is that  a 512% increase in costs buys only a 38% 
increase in the level of biodiversity protection for a 12% landuse constraint. Alternatively these 
cost savings could be used to increase the level of protection under TLRs to 480 twps, or 
approximately 42% of the study area. This increases the amount of habitat protected by 243% 
and the level of biodiversity protection to .195, or by 157% relative to MC. In order to buy an 
equivalent level of protection under MC, it would be necessary to spend $9.4 billion - a 
potentially prohibitive amount. 
                                                 
15 The results are comparable to other estimates of habitat protection costs in the boreal 
mixedwood. Armstrong, Adamowicz et al. (2003) calculate the discounted present value of lost 
forestry opportunity from coarse filter management of 5 preferred habitat types over a 200 year  
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* Note that BC is not attainable due to incomplete information about true land values. 
                                                                                                                                                             
rotation. They find the cost of maintaining 12.5% of the natural distribution of each preferred 
habitat type in the study area  is equal to $4453 per ha. 
 
If decision makers had appropriate price signals, they could implement the BC approach 
and achieve the level of biodiversity protection afforded by the MC solution at the least cost 
(807M). Alternatively, TLRs could provide approximately the same level of coverage for 917 
million. The TLR approach will always be more expensive than BC for achieving a particular 
level of biodiversity protection. However one should be cautious about making such 
comparisons. In the absence of complete species information, the biodiversity measure used in 
the reserve selection algorithm is only a surrogate for actual biodiversity. Even if land values  
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were known, the benefit of the BC approach would depend on the degree to which chosen 
indicators are successful biodiversity surrogates. Similarly, the cost difference between the TLR 
and BC programs is the cost of not having the correct land value information to link incentives 
directly to the biodiversity targets. On the other hand, increasing the level of habitat protected 
under TLRs reduces the level of risk associated with the use of species based biodiversity 
indicators.  
The TLR algorithm illustrates the benefit of substituting more sites in the reserve 
network with lower productivity in terms of resource and biodiversity values. In this study TLRs 
provide large benefits because of the overlap of very productive sites for resource development 
and biodiversity. Ideally scenario analyses should be undertaken as part of a conservation 
planning exercise prior to choosing reserve size constraints and the approach for selecting 
reserves to determine the relative risks associated with different approaches and targets.
5.  Conclusion 
   There are significant obstacles to the implementation of optimal reserve networks. As 
forested land becomes more scarce, issues of "price, tenure, availability, present and future uses 
of adjacent land, access, and protection regimes ... are likely to dominate what might be 
perceived as minor biological differences between sites" (Prendergast, Quinn, and Lawton 1999). 
In this paper we examine the potential for tradable landuse rights to implement biodiversity 
objectives through the selection of an ecological reserve network. TLRs are a coarse filter 
approach to conservation where biodiversity is maintained indirectly through maintenance of 
habitat. Fine filter systems may still be necessary for species whose requirements are not met 
through the coarse filter approach. This paper shows that while markets do not allow the  
  26 
regulator to directly control the selection of sites in the ecological reserve network, there is a 
systematic economic tradeoff between the total amount of habitat protected and the selection of 
high quality sites for biodiversity protection. By allocating habitat patches to areas with the 
lowest opportunity cost in terms of development, the total amount of habitat that can be 
protected at a given cost is increased. Simulation results suggest that the increase in habitat may 
be quite significant. Furthermore, potential cost savings will be greater in markets where there is 
substantial heterogeneity in land values. Given the uncertainty surrounding biodiversity 
outcomes resulting from traditional approaches to reserve design, further research is warranted to 
better understand the efficacy of decentralized instruments for implementing conservation 
objectives. 
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7.  Appendix 
Proof that market solution is optimal requires the assumption of constant returns to scale for land 
holdings so that  c    =    ) h    (    B ij
j
i ∑ ′  is constant. Assume constant returns to scale. Consider the 
pricing strategy of two firms 'a' and 'b'. The FOC defined by (3) shows the marginal benefit to 
firm i  of obtaining the jth piece of land at price pj.  Let H
*
i  denote the optimal portfolio of land 
assets held by each firm, and H i ˆ  represent an alternative portfolio. 
 
Lemma 1.  If  H    =    H
*
i i ˆ  for all i, then no firm has an incentive to reorganize its land portfolio. 
Proof:  Assume the contrary. From (3) firm i has an incentive to reorganize its portfolio as long 
as  
A1.  0   >   p   - ] 
H
B   +  
X










However from (2)   
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λ µ  , for all i and j.  
At the optimum assume that firm a owns parcel j. Then 
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Firm a's reservation price is given by  λ µ    +       =    p j
a
j . Therefore Firm b never has an incentive to 
purchase land from Firm a and vice-versa.  Finally neither a or b have an incentive to trade a 
parcel of land in their portfolio for a parcel of reserve land.  From (A3), and the fact that  0    =    k µ  
if parcel k is in reserve 
A4.  ]
H
B   +  
X
B    [   ] 
H
B   +  
X



















Therefore no firm will prefer a parcel in reserve to their portfolio. 
Lemma 2.  If  H       H
*
i i ≠ ˆ , firms will have an incentive to reorganize their portfolio. 
 
Proof.  If  H       H
*
i i ≠ ˆ , then either  
1.  the inequality in A3 is reversed and firm b's willingness to pay for site j exceeds firm a's 
reservation price in which case the two firms will make a Pareto optimal sale; 
or, 
2. the inequality in A4 is reversed and firm i is willing to trade a parcel of land from H i ˆ  for a 
piece of vacant land. 
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Proposition. The optimal allocation of land, H
*
i , is a Nash Equilibrium. 
Proof: Follows from Lemmas 1 and 2. This outcome depends on constant returns to scale 
otherwise the marginal value of each site depends on the temporal and spatial order in which 
parcels are purchased. Under constant returns firms costlessly reorganize their portfolios, 
building clusters of activity until there is no incentive to reorganize. 
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